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We contrast  the  proposition  that  markets  reveal  independently  existing  preferences  with
the alternative  possibility  that  they  may  help  to  shape  them.  Using  demand-revealing
experimental  market  institutions,  we  separate  the  shaping  effects  of  price  cues  from  the
effects of market  discipline.  We  ﬁnd  that individual  valuations  and  prevailing  prices  are
systematically  affected  by  both  exogenous  manipulations  of price  expectations  and  endoge-
nous  but divergent  price  feedback.  These  effects  persist  to varying  degrees,  in  spite  of  further
market experience.  In some  circumstances,  market  experience  may  actually  consolidate
them.  We discuss  possible  explanations  for  these  effects  of  uninformative  price  cues  on
revealed  preferences.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
There is now abundant evidence that, contrary to the standard assumptions of economic models, the preferences of
conomic agents are often affected by salient but informationally irrelevant cues, speciﬁc to the particular contexts in which
hose preferences are revealed (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968; Bohm et al., 1997; Ariely et al., 2003; Mazar et al., 2013;
ugden et al., 2013; Maniadis et al., 2014).
In this paper, we focus on a speciﬁc form of context-dependence: the systematic effect that observations of, or expectations
bout, actual market prices exert on the valuations of economic agents, even when those prices have no useful informational
ontent for the formation of private values (see Knetsch et al., 2001; Loomes et al., 2003; Tufano, 2009). This effect poses
 challenge to the long-standing view in economics that markets are institutions that simply allow economic agents to
eveal their pre-existing and market-independent preferences: it suggests by contrast that markets may, to a considerable
xtent, shape preferences. In the traditional view, the market is liable to penalise traders who  misreport their preferences
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and thereby encourages them to correct their behaviour (e.g. Binmore, 1999; List, 2003, 2004). Such market discipline, it is
argued, helps to reﬁne the revelation of one’s underlying preferences when these are not immediately accessible but emerge
as the result of a process of ‘discovery’ (Plott, 1996).
Shaping and market discipline are both mechanisms by which prices generated in one trading period can affect behaviour
in subsequent periods, and the effects of both can be cumulative. However, while market discipline is supposed to pull
revealed preferences towards their underlying market-independent value, shaping may  arbitrarily pull them towards
irrelevant cues. In the normal operation of markets, discriminating between these opposing forces may  prove extremely
challenging, as they can result in observationally equivalent behaviour. Taking up this challenge is the main contribution of
our paper. We  present an experiment which uses two manipulations aimed at identifying the extent of shaping effects in
the absence of market discipline, and the power of market discipline to erode the effects of shaping.
In our experimental setup, price cues are devoid of any relevant informational content: people trade privately owned
and individually consumed goods, for which valuations cannot be objectively afﬁliated (e.g. List and Shogren, 1999). Since
these goods only exist in our experiment and are consumed inside the lab, price cues cannot convey any information about
alternative trading opportunities (Harrison et al., 2004).
We use an exogenous and non-informative manipulation to inﬂuence stated price expectations, which act as cues for
valuations. Notice that these are expectations about actual market prices, but have not been inﬂuenced by any previous
market behaviour. So a pure shaping effect – that is, an effect that cannot be attributed to market discipline – can be observed,
if it occurs, in the ﬁrst round of trading. Then, subsequent rounds allow us to observe the effects of market discipline.
We also use a more innovative manipulation that allows us to ‘switch off’ market discipline for identiﬁable subsets of
traders: traders who repeatedly trade at prices that are clearly very advantageous, and traders who repeatedly do not trade
because they face very disadvantageous prices. By repeating the market in the absence of market discipline, we can observe
the cumulative shaping effects of endogenous price feedback. By switching market discipline back on for the same traders,
we can observe its power to erode these shaping effects which, given their cumulative nature, could be quite large.
To preview our results we ﬁnd that, in the absence of market discipline, both manipulations induce extensive shaping
effects. When these shaping effects are exposed to the full forces of market discipline, they are sometimes weakened, but
are not eliminated.
Ultimately, shaping may  arise for a number of reasons. One extreme possibility is that agents do not have preferences
when they get to the market, and construct them using arbitrary cues as anchors (e.g. Slovic, 1995; Lichtenstein and Slovic,
2006; Ariely et al., 2006; Stewart et al., 2006). Or they may react to price information because they use prices as reference
points (e.g. Thaler, 1985; Putler, 1992; Isoni, 2011; Weaver and Frederick, 2012; Bordalo et al., 2012). Our results suggest that
the proposition that preferences are completely malleable is too extreme. Rather, they are compatible with the existence of
underlying preferences of some form, but suggest that these are susceptible to extraneous inﬂuences that may have some
long term residual effect, in spite of the disciplining forces operating in markets.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe our market institution – a median price selling auction –
and derive the institution-speciﬁc hypotheses about shaping and market discipline which our experiments will examine. In
Section 3, we describe our broad experimental design. In Section 4, we  present our ﬁrst manipulation, designed to test for
shaping effects obtained through exogenously inﬂuenced price expectations. Section 5 focuses on our second manipulation,
in which we study the role of endogenous price feedback. Some issues raised by our results are discussed in Section 6. In
Section 7 we offer some concluding remarks.
2. Shaping and market discipline in repeated selling auctions
All of our treatments employ repeated median-price selling auctions for monetary lotteries. In each auction round, each
trader is endowed with a lottery and is asked to consider a set of discrete amounts of money spanning a given range and to
say, for each amount, whether or not they would accept it in exchange for the lottery. The elicitation procedure (described
in detail in Section 3) is constrained to impose consistency: anyone who  reports willingness (unwillingness) to accept some
amount x must also report willingness (unwillingness) to accept any higher (lower) amount. The smallest amount of money
the trader would accept is their willingness-to-accept valuation (WTA); the largest amount of money they would not accept is
their not-willing-to-accept valuation (NWTA). (Implicitly, the trader is reporting that they value the lottery at least as much
as NWTA but no less than WTA.) The median NWTA is identiﬁed and announced as the market price for that round. Traders
whose NWTAs are strictly less than the announced price (i.e. who have reported willingness to accept that price) sell their
lotteries back to the experimenter at that price; and if this round of trading is randomly selected at the end of the experiment
to be the basis of payment, they are then paid that amount. The other traders keep their lotteries: if this round is selected,
they play out the lottery and are paid accordingly. Since we are interested in the shaping effect of price cues, there is no
resolution of lotteries until after the last round and there is no information about other traders’ responses except in the form
of the median NWTA which constitutes the market price.
At the end of each auction round, traders are told the market price for that round and hence whether they have sold or
not. According to the shaping hypothesis,  traders are liable to revise their NWTAs for the next round in the direction of the
observed prices. This creates a tendency for NWTAs to be pulled in the direction of price cues, other things being equal.
This tendency is conceptually different from value afﬁliation. Afﬁliated values reﬂect a positive correlation between non-
observed objective properties of a good (e.g. the worth of a common-value resource), while shaping reﬂects a correlation
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etween subjective attitudes (e.g. each individual’s valuation of a private good) originating from a public signal. For a con-
rolled test of the shaping hypothesis, we need a design that is able to screen out objective afﬁliation, while allowing for
ubjective values to be correlated. Whether or not shaping can be reconciled with standard rationality assumptions is a
egitimate question, but not the focus of our investigation, which centres on whether the phenomenon exists or not, and
ow strong it is.
Our controlled test makes use of several convenient properties of monetary lotteries. Because attitudes to risk can vary
cross individuals, a given lottery is likely to have different private values for different individuals. So the market price for
 lottery should provide no objective information that is relevant for an individual’s judgement of its private value to them,
ven though it reﬂects other people’s judgements about its worth. In addition, since the lotteries we use have no immediate
ubstitutes outside the lab and are ‘consumed’ inside the lab (in the sense that lottery outcomes are resolved at the end of
he experiment), the value of a lottery to a participant cannot be rationally affected by inferences about external trading
pportunities. A further feature of lotteries, which we  shall exploit, is that their maximum and minimum private values are
iven by the highest and lowest outcomes.
Controlling for objectively afﬁliated values and outside trading opportunities is not the only challenge one faces when
esting for shaping effects. As we explain below, if other factors such as market discipline are not controlled for, observing
hat valuations move towards previously observed prices is not necessarily evidence that preferences are market-dependent.
he ﬁrst goal of our experiment is to see if shaping effects occur when market discipline is switched off.
The market discipline hypothesis posits that agents possess preferences of some form, which are independent of the market.
or expositional convenience, here we make the conventional assumption that each trader has a unique true private value
or the traded object.1
Our market institution is a variant of the Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961). So if traders have true market-independent
rivate values, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each trader to report an NWTA consistent with their private value (Milgrom
nd Weber, 1982). If these true values were readily accessible and the dominant strategy were easily comprehended, then
raders would behave optimally each time they took part in the auction, and repetition would have no effect whatsoever.
owever, even if underlying preferences satisfy standard assumptions, true values may  not be readily accessible, or the best
trategy may  not be immediately obvious, so that there may  be circumstances in which traders deviate from this strategy
n one way or another. Such deviations may  prove costly, in which case market discipline can come into play.
To see this, consider a median-price auction with n traders (where n is an odd number), indexed by i = 1, . . .,  n. Assume each
rader has a true value vi. If the trader responds optimally to the elicitation procedure, their reported WTA  will be greater than
r equal to vi, and their reported NWTA, which we denote ai, will be less than or equal to vi. However, their actual response
ay  be different because of some ‘error’ (which may  be random, or may  reﬂect some systematic behavioural anomaly).
arket discipline operates by exposing the cases in which deviating from the optimal strategy of reporting WTA  ≥ vi ≥ ai
esults in an undesired outcome. This happens whenever ai ≥ p > vi or vi > p > ai. In the ﬁrst case, the trader over-asks and fails
o sell at p, which is more than their true valuation, thus foregoing a potential gain. In the second case, they under-ask and
ell at p, which is less than their true valuation, making them worse off. In both of these situations, given the realised price,
hey would have experienced a better outcome had they followed the optimal strategy. To avoid incurring the same loss
gain, they should revise their ai in the direction of vi in subsequent rounds.2 Notice that, if they do so, they also revise ai in
he direction of the market price. That is, market discipline produces an empirical tendency analogous to a shaping effect,
hich is why, when market discipline is in operation, it is difﬁcult to isolate shaping effects.
However, this disciplining effect does not necessarily come to bear on every trader who  does not behave optimally. There
re situations in which traders over-ask or under-ask but the auction still has the same implications for them as if they had
ollowed the optimal strategy. This happens whenever p > ai > vi or else vi > ai ≥ p.
Since market discipline works only on traders for whom ai ≥ p > vi or vi > p > ai, the traders who are subject to discipline
re likely to have true values that are relatively close to the market price. If the market is repeated, changes in behaviour
ill continue to be induced among such marginal traders until they are no longer vulnerable to market discipline. This is the
ase if and only if p > vi holds for all traders i who sell, and vj ≥ p holds for all traders j who  do not sell. On the simplifying
ssumption that the median NWTA is reported by only one trader, the (n − 1)/2 traders with the lowest NWTAs sell, and the
n + 1)/2 traders with the highest NWTAs do not sell. Thus, when no trader is subject to market discipline, the market price
ies between the [(n − 1)/2]th highest and the [(n + 1)/2]th highest true values – just as conventional microeconomic theory
ould predict for a median-price market. In other words, if one deﬁnes the true market price as the price that would prevailf all traders followed the optimal strategy, market discipline produces a tendency for the market price to converge to its true
alue. This is the implication of the market discipline hypothesis that we  will test.
1 As we will explain in Section 6, market discipline does not require that preferences are characterised by such a degree of precision, but can operate in
n  analogous way on imprecise preferences, as long as these are independent of the market.
2 Here, we  make no further assumption about the speed with which true values (or the optimal strategy for reporting these) are discovered. On an extreme
nterpretation, one could think that a single costly error would be sufﬁcient for a participant to discover their true value. Alternatively, convergence could
e  a gradual process, in which NWTAs are slowly updated in the direction suggested by the error the participant made (i.e. by decreasing one’s NWTA in
ase  of over-asking and increasing it in the opposite case).
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However, as noted earlier, there may  be traders whose true values are far enough away from the prices generated by
repeated markets that their NWTAs never fall between their true values and the realised price. Such traders never experience
the costs that give rise to market discipline. Nevertheless, they are exposed to the shaping effects of price feedback. If traders
with these characteristics can be identiﬁed, it is possible to test for the existence and strength of shaping effects while
screening out the effects of market discipline. One of our manipulations allows us to switch off market discipline and expose
traders to endogenous price feedback cues which, if shaping occurs, will tend to pull their NWTAs away from their true
values in a particular direction. Then, by setting up repeated markets in which all participants’ NWTAs have previously been
shaped in the same way, we can switch market discipline on and test whether prices in these markets converge towards a
hypothesised true market price.
In our experiment, we will test the following general implications of shaping and market discipline:
Hypothesis 1 (Pure shaping). Absent market discipline, NWTAs are pulled in the direction of uninformative price cues.
Hypothesis 2 (Market discipline).  With repetition, prices converge to values independent of uninformative price cues.
3. Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted in 18 sessions at the University of East Anglia and was implemented using the Zurich
Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments (Fischbacher, 2007). The 204 participants were recruited via email shots
from the general student population.
In each session participants took part in three auctions, each repeated eight times, for a total of 24 auction periods.
In each session, there were either ten or twelve participants, who were assigned to two trading groups of either ﬁve or
seven participants (our second manipulation required us to have auction groups of two  different sizes). Participants were
re-matched to form different trading groups before the start of each auction, but the composition of trading groups was kept
constant during the eight rounds of an auction.
One of the auctions implemented our EXP manipulation (shaping through price expectations; see Section 4 for details).
Whether this auction came ﬁrst or last was counterbalanced across sessions. The remaining two auctions implemented our
FBK manipulation (shaping through price feedback), and were always run in sequence (see Section 5).3
In each round of each auction, each participant saw a lottery displayed on their screen. Lotteries always had exactly two
possible outcomes; these were positive amounts of money or prizes.  Participants were told they owned the lottery displayed
on their screen and had the opportunity to sell it. They were presented with a list of prices and asked to state whether or
not they would be willing to sell their lottery at each price. The prices (in £) always ranged from z + 0.01 to y, where y and
z, y > z, were the two prizes.4 The 0.01 was added to the lower prize to ensure that NWTA was  deﬁned for participants who
accepted every price, in which case their NWTA was set equal to z. For participants who rejected every price, NWTA was set
equal to y. It was explained to participants why it would be inconsistent to value the lottery above y or below z.5 Participants
were told that if they agreed to sell for £x, they should also be willing to sell for any amount greater than £x (i.e. they were
not allowed to switch back and forth in the multiple-price list). Once entered, responses could be changed by restarting the
whole process, but this was only possible once. At the end of the process, the computer recorded each participant’s NWTA.
After an NWTA was recorded for each trader in a group, the computer determined the market price by selecting the median
of these amounts. The instructions explained how the market price was obtained, and the possible trading implications.
Before the beginning of the ﬁrst auction, there was a practice round for participants to familiarise themselves with the
elicitation procedures. Their understanding of the basic rules was tested by means of a computerised questionnaire.
At the end of each session the computer randomly selected one of the auction rounds that had been completed by the
participant.6 If the participant had sold their lottery in that round, they received the market price. If they had kept the lottery,
they played it out and received its outcome. Lotteries were resolved by drawing one of a hundred numbered discs from a
bag. The outcome associated with each number was clearly indicated by the lottery display (see online Appendix for an
example). If the selected auction round was from the ﬁrst manipulation, participants were also rewarded for their accuracy
in predicting the market price in the other group (see Section 4.1). Sessions lasted an hour and ﬁve minutes on average, and
the average earning was  £7.50.
3 The full list of sessions, outlining our manipulations and counterbalancing, can be found in the Appendix, Table A.2.1.
4 In order to avoid having to present participants with very long lists of prices, the elicitation procedure had a number of steps. In the ﬁrst step, the
prices on offer started from £(z + 0.01) and went to £y covering all multiples of £1 (for one of our lotteries, we had an extra step at the beginning, in which
all  prices except the lowest were multiples of £10). In the last step, the £1 range between the lowest price that the individual accepted and the highest
price  she rejected in the previous step was broken down in £0.10 intervals, to arrive at an NWTA expressed as a multiple of £0.10. For some participants
prices  went up from £(z + 0.01) to £y, for others they went down from £y to £(z + 0.01). Some screenshots of this elicitation procedure can be found in the
Appendix.
5 As we  explain in Section 5.1, this aspect of the elicitation procedure was crucial for our second manipulation. Gneezy et al. (2006) report evidence that
some  participants value lotteries less than their worst possible outcome, a ﬁnding that they label the uncertainty effect. However, one of the conditions
for  this effect to occur is that the prizes of the lottery to be valued are not directly expressed in monetary terms (ibid. p. 1290), which is not true in our
experiment.
6 Since our second manipulation required that some participants did not take part in one of the auctions, some participants completed 24 rounds and
others just 16.
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Table  1
Ranges for price expectation cues in EXP manipulation.
High Cue Low Cue
£20 or more £1.00–£2.00
£19.90–£15.00 £2.10–£3.00
£14.90–£10.00 £3.10–£4.00
£9.90–£5.00 £4.10–£5.00
£4.90–£1.00 £5.10 or more
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their session by selecting one of the relevant ﬁve ranges and then entering a
value falling within that range.
. EXP manipulation: shaping through price expectations
.1. Design
Our ﬁrst manipulation was designed to investigate whether NWTAs can be shaped by divergent price expectations
Hypothesis 1), and whether any resulting shaping effects are removed by market discipline (Hypothesis 2). These treatments
nvolved a repeated auction, in which every trader was  endowed with the same lottery. In order to allow room for sizeable
haping effects, we chose a lottery with a fairly high variance. Let K = (£z, p; £y, 1 − p) denote a generic binary lottery offering
z with probability p, and £y with probability 1 − p. The lottery used in this part of the experiment was:
E = (£1, 0.95; £50,  0.05).
We randomly divided participants into two groups, which we  label the High Cue and Low Cue markets. Each market
onsisted of eight auction rounds conducted as explained in Section 3. We  told participants that there were two  trading
roups in the room, and that everyone had the same lottery. Before the ﬁrst auction round, we  asked them to predict what
he price would be in the other trading group, by selecting a range from a list and then reporting a point estimate within the
hosen range. If one of these auction rounds was selected to be paid at the end of the experiment, they were rewarded for
he accuracy of their predictions, using an absolute loss function with maximum reward of £2. (Because predictions were
ade about the other group, there was no incentive for participants to misreport valuations in an attempt to make their
redictions come true.) The same procedure was repeated before the last auction round to see if participants’ expectations
djusted to the price feedback they received.
The High and Low Cue groups differed in terms of the ranges of prices they were presented with. These are shown in
able 1.
Both lists in Table 1 cover the whole range of values between the two  prizes of lottery E, but they differ in two important
espects. First, the middle range contains much higher values for the High Cue market than for the Low Cue market. Second,
he High Cue ranges are presented in decreasing order, while the Low Cue ranges are presented in increasing order. We
xpected both of these aspects to induce higher price estimates in the High Cue condition than in the Low Cue condition, on
he grounds that the ﬁrst and the middle ranges are more salient than the others (these effects are known in the psychology
iterature as ‘range frequency effects’; see Parducci, 1965; Parducci and Weddell, 1986).7
If participants have well-formed true values, such manipulations should have no effect; but if they are prone to shaping
ffects, the ﬁrst-round NWTAs in the High Cue markets could be substantially larger than the ﬁrst-round NWTAs in the Low
ue market. Since no feedback is provided until the end of the ﬁrst round, the initial NWTAs may  be subject to shaping, but
annot have been affected by market discipline. In this setting, Hypothesis 1 implies that NWTAs will be higher in the High
ue group than in the Low Cue group.
As the auction is repeated with feedback, market discipline is switched on and we  can investigate its effects. Because
raders have been randomised between the two treatments, any underlying true values – including the true value of the
arket price – should have similar distributions in the two  subsamples. Therefore, as the auction is repeated, Hypothesis 2
mplies that market discipline should induce convergence of the prices prevailing in the two markets.
.2. Results
Table 2 reports the data of the High Cue and Low Cue markets of our EXP manipulation. For both treatments, the table
eports the number of observations, mean, median and standard deviation of the predicted market prices, the actual NWTAs
nd the actual market prices in rounds 1 (R1) through 8 (R8).
We will discuss the data with reference to Fig. 1, which uses the following conventions. Solid markers joined by solid
ines refer to the High Cue group, while empty markers joined by dashed lines refer to the Low Cue group. Mean NWTAs are
7 This manipulation bears some similarity to anchoring manipulations (e.g. Ariely et al., 2003), but the ﬁnal price prediction is, effectively, a self-generated
nchor.
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Table 2
Results of EXP manipulation: shaping through price expectations. NWTA valuations and market prices for lottery E = (£1, 0.95; £50, 0.05).
NWTA Market prices
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Obs. Mean Median St. dev.
E Low Cue predictions R1 102 6.72 4.05 7.23
E  Low Cue predictions R8 102 4.94 4.35 3.18
E  Low Cue R1 102 10.21 5.40 10.46 18 6.90 6.30 3.26
E  Low Cue R2 102 8.56 5.35 8.54 18 7.37 5.10 5.68
E  Low Cue R3 102 7.61 4.90 7.21 18 6.43 4.65 3.95
E  Low Cue R4 102 8.61 4.80 10.50 18 6.42 4.70 4.65
E  Low Cue R5 102 7.64 4.40 9.62 18 5.03 4.45 2.08
E  Low Cue R6 102 6.85 4.30 7.62 18 4.74 4.25 2.07
E  Low Cue R7 102 7.20 4.20 9.47 18 4.61 4.30 1.92
E  Low Cue R8 102 6.73 4.20 7.92 18 4.38 4.20 1.98
E  High Cue predictions R1 102 12.11 12.25 7.99
E  High Cue predictions R8 102 7.51 6.05 4.82
E  High Cue R1 102 12.11 10.05 9.97 18 10.19 10.00 4.17
E  High Cue R2 102 9.64 8.90 6.95 18 8.37 7.90 3.10
E  High Cue R3 102 9.36 7.40 8.28 18 8.68 8.00 3.91
E  High Cue R4 102 8.04 7.30 5.04 18 8.19 7.40 3.61
E  High Cue R5 102 8.13 6.40 5.99 18 7.48 7.10 3.14
E  High Cue R6 102 8.28 6.20 7.57 18 6.77 6.50 2.86
E  High Cue R7 102 8.29 5.40 8.64 18 6.06 5.20 2.51
E  High Cue R8 102 8.08 5.15 8.96 18 6.33 5.70 2.71
102 participants (18 groups of 5 or 7) were assigned to the Low Cue treatment, 102 (18 groups of 5 or 7) to the High Cue treatment. Each group traded for 8
rounds, with feedback about market price and trading outcome after each round. Price predictions were elicited before R1 and before R8 using either Low
or  High cues.
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
V
al
ue
s 
(£
)
Auction Round
Exp. High
Ask Hig h
Price High
Exp. Low
Ask Lo w
Price Low
NWTA Hig h
NWTA LowFig. 1. Results of the EXP manipulation. Evolution of NWTAs and prices in the High Cue and Low Cue markets. Note: High Cue denoted by solid markers
joined by solid lines. Low Cue denoted by empty markers joined by dashed lines; squares are mean NWTAs; triangles are mean actual market prices; solid
(empty) diamonds are mean price predictions for High (Low) Cue.
presented by squares, while mean actual market prices are shown by triangles. The mean price predictions are represented
by the diamonds.
The ﬁrst issue is to establish whether our manipulation has affected price expectations. This is a prerequisite for testing
the implications of Hypothesis 1. In R1, the mean (median) expectation is £12.11 (£12.25) in the High Cue market and £6.72
(£4.05) in the Low Cue market; this difference is strongly signiﬁcant in a one-tail Mann–Whitney test (Z = −6.44, p < 0.001).Given that we have been successful at manipulating participants’ price expectations, we  can test the implications of
Hypothesis 1 by comparing NWTAs in R1 between the two groups, when market discipline cannot operate. The mean
(median) NWTA in R1 is £12.11 (£10.05) in the High Cue market and £10.21 (£5.40) in the Low Cue market.8 The two NWTA
8 Some readers may ﬁnd it surprising that our participants’ NWTAs for a lottery whose expected value is just £3.45 were so high. However, lottery E has
the  characteristics of a ‘$-bet’ (i.e. a lottery offering small chance of winning a large prize). The preference reversal literature provides robust evidence that
such  lotteries are often overvalued relative to their expected values (see Seidl, 2002).
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Table  3
Evolution of NWTA valuations in Low Cue and High Cue markets for sellers and non-sellers.
Auction round t NWTAt if sold at t − 1 NWTAt if not sold at t − 1
<0 0 >0 Mean <0 0 >0 Mean
Low Cue
R1 1 – – – – – –
R2  2 3 7 31 2.85 48 7 6 −4.66
R3  3 7 11 24 1.03 38 13 9 −2.34
R4  4 6 12 21 2.42 43 9 11 0.12
R5  5 11 16 13 1.23 37 11 14 −2.38
R6  6 10 16 13 0.41 46 9 8 −1.55
R7  7 12 16 11 1.18 31 22 10 −0.16
R8  8 15 14 12 1.14 28 22 11 −1.55
High  Cue
R1 1 – – – – – –
R2  2 3 11 26 3.29 53 3 6 −6.20
R3  3 5 11 23 3.97 48 6 9 −2.91
R4  4 5 14 23 1.40 42 9 9 −3.22
R5  5 6 17 18 1.42 44 8 9 −0.80
R6  6 9 20 9 0.77 43 13 8 −0.22
R7  7 11 14 17 1.63 40 12 8 −1.11
R8  8 7 12 20 1.12 33 16 14 −1.03
Change in NWTA from round to round, NWTAt = NWTAt − NWTAt−1, for participants who  sold and participants who did not sell in the previous round. For
each  round of the auction, the numbers of sellers and non-sellers who decreased, kept constant and increased their NWTA valuation is reported together
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istributions differ signiﬁcantly in a one-tail Mann–Whitney test (Z = −2.17, p < 0.05). These ﬁndings provide support for the
mplications of Hypothesis 1, and constitute our Result 1a.
Result 1a – Shaping through price expectations. In the absence of market discipline, NWTAs are pulled in the direction
f uninformative price expectation cues.
We can now ask how far the shaping effects of price expectation cues persist in the face of market discipline. According
o Hypothesis 2, market discipline should lead market prices to converge to values that are independent of uninformative
rice cues. Since participants were randomly allocated to the two  treatments, this means that, with repetition, market
rices should converge to the same value in the High and Low Cue groups. For this test to be meaningful, we need our
XP manipulation to have produced a difference in market prices. In R1, the mean (median) market price is £10.19 (£10)
n the High Cue group and £6.90 (£6.30) in the Low Cue group, a difference that is statistically signiﬁcant in a one-tail
ann–Whitney test (Z = −2.36, p < 0.05).
In order to test the implications of Hypothesis 2, we compare market prices in the last round of the auction, when market
iscipline has had the best opportunity to exert its effects. In R8, the mean (median) price is £6.33 (£5.70) in the High
ue group and £4.38 (£4.20) in the Low Cue group. Although the absolute difference between the mean (median) prices
bserved in the two groups is smaller in R8 than in R1, the distributions of market prices still differ signiﬁcantly between
he two groups in a one-tail Mann–Whitney test (Z = −2.66, p < 0.01).9 Therefore, we  do not ﬁnd support for the implications
f Hypothesis 2.10 This constitutes our Result 2a.
Result 2a – Persistence of shaping through price expectations. After eight auction rounds, prices that have been shaped
y uninformative price expectation cues are still signiﬁcantly affected by those cues.
The evolution of NWTA valuations over the eight auction rounds is summarised in Table 3. For rounds 2 through 8 of the
ow Cue and High Cue markets, the table reports the numbers of participants who decreased, kept unaltered or increased
heir NWTA, depending on whether they sold or kept their lottery in the previous round. For both sellers and non-sellers,
he table also shows the mean change in NWTA, NWTAt = NWTAt − NWTAt−1, from round to round.
9 Participants’ price expectations, which we  elicited again before R8, are consistent with this persistent difference. The mean (median) R8 prediction is
7.51 (£6.05) in the High Cue group and £4.94 (£4.35) in the Low Cue group. While the trends in the distributions of market prices are clearly visible in
ig. 1, it is possible that the elicitation of price expectations before R8 had an amplifying effect on NWTA (and price) differences. If we test the implications
f  Hypothesis 2 using the R7 prices instead, we  still ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences (Z = –2.06, p < 0.05 in a one-tail Mann–Whitney test).
10 The theoretical analysis of Section 2, which forms the basis for Hypothesis 2, presupposes that costly errors are entirely removed. This raises the question
f  whether eight auction rounds are sufﬁcient for prices to have stabilised, a question that we  have tried to answer by estimating a simple asymptotic
unction for the market price: pt = p * + (1/t)b where pt is the market price in round t, p* is the asymptotic value of the market price, and b is a parameter
elated to the speed of convergence. Apart from its ease of interpretation, an advantage of this model is that it can be easily estimated with OLS. The key
arameter is p*.  By comparing its value in the High Cue and the Low Cue treatments, we can check whether prices are tending towards different values. The
stimated values of p* are £6.35 in the High Cue group and £4.75 in the Low Cue group. These values are signiﬁcantly different from each other (p < 0.1),
ndicating that prices appear to be tending towards different values in the two groups. See Table A.3.1 in the Appendix for details.
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Table 3 reveals a striking regularity. In both the High and Low Cue groups, participants have a prevalent tendency to
increase their NWTA if they sold in the previous round and an opposite tendency to decrease their NWTA if they did not
sell.11 The effect weakens over time, as more participants keep their NWTAs unaltered. This constitutes our ﬁrst observation.
Observation 1 – NWTA updating in High and Low Cue markets. In High and Low Cue markets, sellers tend to increase
their NWTA and non-sellers tend to decrease their NWTA.
Observation 1 shows that both sellers and non-sellers revise their NWTAs in the direction of the market price. But because
we have no information about their true values, we cannot tell whether this is an effect of shaping, market discipline or both.
This clearly illustrates why, if one is interested in the cumulative effect of shaping, it is useful to shut off market discipline.
This is the objective of our FBK manipulation.
5. FBK manipulation: shaping through price feedback
5.1. Design
Our second manipulation is designed to study the effect of price feedback cues on NWTAs. Unlike the price expectation
cues that we employed in our EXP manipulation, these cues are endogenous, as they are generated by the normal operation
of the market.
We  randomly divided participants between two  treatments, the control treatment and the shaping treatment. The control
treatment was run in sessions with ten participants. Each participant took part in two  series of repeated auctions belonging
to the FBK manipulation, one for each of two different lotteries, a low-value lottery L and a high-value lottery H (see below
for the speciﬁcs of these lotteries). In each repeated auction, there were eight rounds. The order of the two lotteries was
counterbalanced between sessions. In this treatment, all traders taking part in the same auction were endowed with the
same lottery, so that the price feedback reﬂected the median NWTA for that lottery in the relevant round. Each of these
markets had exactly ﬁve traders.
By contrast, the shaping treatment was run in sessions with twelve participants. As in the control treatment, there were
two series of repeated auctions involving eight rounds per series. The ﬁrst series in each session was designed to create
conditions under which the cumulative effects of shaping could be observed in the absence of market discipline, hence
allowing us to test the implications of Hypothesis 1. The second series of eight rounds was designed to examine the impact
of market discipline on any such effects, as a test of Hypothesis 2.
In each session of the shaping treatment, the ﬁrst series consisted of mixed markets, in which different traders were
endowed with different lotteries. There was one market with seven traders – three endowed with L, three with H, and one
with a medium-value lottery M – and another market with ﬁve traders – two  endowed with L, two with H, and one with M.
This arrangement allowed us to drop the two traders who had been endowed with M from the second series12, and reassign
the ten participants who had previously been endowed with L or H to two  homogenous markets. That is, the ﬁve traders
in a session who had been endowed with L in the ﬁrst series continued to trade L, but now as part of one market where
all ﬁve traders were endowed with L, while the other market consisted of the ﬁve traders who  had been, and continued to
be, endowed with H. Since both homogeneous and control markets consisted of traders endowed with the same lottery (L
in some markets, H in others), we can judge the persistence of shaping effects by comparing the patterns of prices in our
second-series homogeneous markets with those in the corresponding control markets.
The key innovation of the FBK manipulation is the ability to shape NWTAs through the ﬁrst-series mixed markets. We
now explain this manipulation in more detail. We  used the following binary lotteries:
L = (£2, 0.8; £9, 0.2),
M = (£7, 0.5; £9, 0.5),
H = (£7, 0.2; £14,  0.8).
Since each trader’s NWTA was constrained to be no greater than the higher lottery prize and no less than the lower (seeSection 3), the distribution of endowments in the mixed markets ensured that the market price in these markets was bound
to lie in the (£7, £9) interval.13
In these markets, traders were given no information about the lotteries owned by other traders. When we  explained how
participants should respond to questions about their willingness to accept stated prices, we stressed that these responses
11 In both groups, being a seller in the previous round has a highly signiﬁcant positive effect on NWTAt in a random-effects panel regression. See Table
A.3.2  in the Appendix for details.
12 These participants, whose presence was required for our manipulation of the price feedback (see below), were instead asked to complete an unrelated
questionnaire.
13 Because of the constraint on individual NWTAs, only L traders could report NWTAs below £7, and only H traders could report NWTAs above £9. The
presence of one M trader in each group ensured that fewer than half of the traders in the market were endowed with L, and fewer than half with H, so the
median ask was  bound to be in the (£7, £9) interval, the range of admissible asks for M traders.
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ere strictly personal and should simply reﬂect their own evaluation of the lottery they were endowed with. Under these
ircumstances, from a conventional point of view, it should be irrelevant what other people do and what the actual market
rice turns out to be.14
A key feature of our mixed market design is that, since NWTAs in the (£7, £9) interval were admissible for all lotteries,
he price feedback was credible for all traders. However, the expected value of L (£3.40) was  much lower than the lowest
ossible price (£7), while the expected value of H (£12.60) was  much larger than the highest possible price (£9). This makes
he price feedback fairly high for L traders, and fairly low for H traders, creating the potential for sizeable shaping effects.
Because the expected values of L and H lie well outside the range of possible prices, most L and H traders were unlikely to
e subject to market discipline, even if there were strong shaping effects. Consider L traders under the assumption that true
alues exist and are unique (the case of H traders is a mirror image). Since these traders were reporting NWTAs for lotteries
hat were far inferior to those held by the majority of traders in the market, it is natural to expect that in the ﬁrst auction
ound the price would be much higher than the true values and NWTAs of almost all L traders. If this was the case, L traders
ould sell at such an advantageous price that market discipline would not bite. Nevertheless, the high price would still have
he potential to exert an upward shaping effect on their NWTAs. Because of its cumulative nature, over successive auction
ounds this shaping effect could be quite strong and yet still not raise NWTAs to a level at which any L traders would fail
o sell (and hence become subject to market discipline). This feature of our design allows us, in effect, to switch off market
iscipline and test whether valuations can be shaped by endogenous price cues.15 Therefore, Hypothesis 1 implies that, after
epeated exposure to market price feedback cues, NWTAs for each of lottery L and H should differ between mixed markets
nd the corresponding control markets.
Market discipline was  switched on when traders were reassigned to homogeneous markets. Suppose that ﬁve L traders
hose NWTAs have all been shaped upwards in mixed markets now take part in the same homogeneous market, and that
ach of them initially reports the same NWTA as in the last round of the mixed market. Then, the traders reporting the
ighest of these NWTAs will no longer sell. For these traders, ai ≥ p > vi: they over-ask and fail to sell at an advantageous
rice. According to the market discipline hypothesis, they should react by reducing their NWTAs in the next round. This
ends to produce a fall in the price in the next round. Again, the traders who  now state the highest NWTAs fail to sell;
f these traders are still over-asking, market discipline leads them to lower their NWTAs in the following round, and the
rice falls again; and so on, until any over-asking is eliminated in the marginal traders. A mirror-image argument applies to
omogeneous H markets.
As explained in Section 2, if agents had precise and market-independent true values, this process of adjustment would
ome to an end when the price reached its true value, which is fully determined by the distribution of traders’ true values.
ince participants were randomised between homogeneous and control markets, the distributions of traders’ true values
hould not differ systematically between these markets. Thus, Hypothesis 2 implies that, with repetition, prices in homo-
eneous markets should converge to values that are not signiﬁcantly different from those observed in the corresponding
ontrol markets.
.2. Results
Table 4 reports the data we gathered in the mixed, homogeneous and control markets for the L lottery (in the top panel)
nd the H lottery (in the bottom panel). Each row reports the number of observations, mean, median and standard deviation
f both the NWTAs and market prices for either the H or L lottery.
The key results will be presented with the aid of Fig. 2, which shows the evolution of NWTAs and prices in mixed and
ontrol markets (panels a and b) and in homogeneous and control markets (panels c and d). In each panel, squares denote
ean NWTA and triangles denote mean market prices in the relevant market. Data for mixed and homogeneous markets
re shown using solid lines (remember that the same participants took part in mixed markets followed by homogeneous
arkets), while dashed lines refer to control markets.
We start by looking at mixed markets. One of our objectives with these markets was to provide price feedback without
he potential for this feedback to trigger market discipline. In order to have a sense of whether we  achieved this, we can
ook at the frequencies with which L traders (who were expected to trade) and H traders (who were expected to keep their
otteries) did actually sell. Over the ﬁrst seven rounds of the mixed markets (we do not consider the last round because
eedback received in that round could have no effect on observed NWTAs or prices), 68% of the L traders sold in every round,
nd 93% sold at least six times. 88% of the H traders never sold, and 97% sold at most once.16 Thus, although a small number
f exceptionally high L NWTAs and an even smaller number of exceptionally low H NWTAs probably were subject to market
14 We have no way to tell whether or not participants thought other traders in their group were trading the same lottery. Each individual’s decision was
ramed as a decision as to whether or not they wanted to sell their lottery at any given price, and incentivised accordingly. This is all we need for our tests of
he  shaping hypothesis. Our assignment of lotteries to participants is analogous to the induced value technique adopted in experimental economics since
hamberlin (1948) and Smith (1962) to study market behaviour. We use lotteries instead of tokens to make large shaping effects possible, and employ a
edian-price instead of a double-oral auction, but participants only trade if the price is acceptable to them.
15 The auxiliary hypothesis that L and H traders are rarely subject to market discipline can be veriﬁed by considering the frequencies with which L traders
ail  to sell and H traders sell (see Section 5.2 below).
16 The raw numbers of sellers of each lottery in mixed markets can be found in the Appendix, Table A.3.3.
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Table 4
Results of FBK manipulation: shaping through price expectations.
NWTA Market prices
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Obs. Mean Median St. dev.
NWTA valuations and market prices for lottery L = (£2, 0.8; £9, 0.2)a
L control R1 60 4.25 4.00 1.10 12 4.15 3.95 0.72
L  control R2 60 4.20 4.00 1.16 12 4.04 4.00 0.45
L  control R3 60 4.21 3.90 1.38 12 3.85 3.80 0.44
L  control R4 60 4.09 3.70 1.37 12 3.78 3.55 0.58
L  control R5 60 3.94 3.80 1.15 12 3.78 3.80 0.53
L  control R6 60 3.99 3.80 1.14 12 3.80 3.85 0.54
L  control R7 60 3.96 3.70 1.20 12 3.73 3.65 0.56
L  control R8 60 3.83 3.70 0.93 12 3.68 3.55 0.55
L  mixed R1 60 4.64 4.40 1.62 24 7.93 7.90 0.55
L  mixed R2 60 4.93 4.70 1.54 24 7.74 7.70 0.53
L  mixed R3 60 5.04 4.95 1.51 24 7.60 7.50 0.59
L  mixed R4 60 5.53 5.45 1.64 24 7.65 7.60 0.62
L  mixed R5 60 5.46 5.45 1.52 24 7.61 7.80 0.55
L  mixed R6 60 5.67 5.80 1.64 24 7.64 7.70 0.55
L  mixed R7 60 5.72 5.90 1.71 24 7.67 7.65 0.58
L  mixed R8 60 5.67 6.45 1.82 24 7.57 7.50 0.50
L  homogeneous R1 60 5.35 5.40 1.49 12 5.53 5.40 0.88
L  homogeneous R2 60 4.94 4.85 1.50 12 4.93 4.85 0.92
L  homogeneous R3 60 4.52 4.40 1.48 12 4.38 4.20 0.87
L  homogeneous R4 60 4.81 4.40 1.75 12 4.87 4.75 1.18
L  homogeneous R5 60 4.65 4.40 1.59 12 4.62 4.35 1.19
L  homogeneous R6 60 4.57 4.40 1.56 12 4.43 4.00 1.13
L  homogeneous R7 60 4.40 4.10 1.47 12 4.23 4.00 0.98
L  homogeneous R8 60 4.60 4.25 1.72 12 4.42 4.20 1.15
NWTA Market prices
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Obs. Mean Median St. dev.
NWTA valuations and market prices for lottery H = (£7, 0.2; £14, 0.8)b
H control R1 60 11.17 11.45 1.66 12 11.46 11.45 0.71
H  control R2 60 11.09 11.35 1.36 12 10.97 10.90 0.88
H  control R3 60 11.10 10.95 1.34 12 10.93 11.05 1.00
H  control R4 60 11.08 11.40 1.39 12 10.93 11.50 1.18
H  control R5 60 11.21 11.50 1.45 12 11.02 11.45 1.26
H  control R6 60 11.19 11.40 1.41 12 10.98 11.30 1.09
H  control R7 60 11.14 11.30 1.34 12 10.98 11.10 1.13
H  control R8 60 10.97 11.20 1.32 12 10.93 11.30 1.11
H  mixed R1 60 10.91 11.10 1.66 24 7.93 7.90 0.55
H  mixed R2 60 10.91 11.25 1.66 24 7.74 7.70 0.53
H  mixed R3 60 10.26 10.45 1.97 24 7.60 7.50 0.59
H  mixed R4 60 9.95 10.10 1.99 24 7.65 7.60 0.62
H  mixed R5 60 9.93 10.15 2.07 24 7.61 7.80 0.55
H  mixed R6 60 10.05 10.40 2.07 24 7.64 7.70 0.55
H  mixed R7 60 9.86 9.95 2.00 24 7.67 7.65 0.58
H  mixed R8 60 10.09 10.50 2.06 24 7.57 7.50 0.50
H  homogeneous R1 60 10.26 10.40 1.81 12 10.55 10.35 1.05
H  homogeneous R2 60 10.55 10.50 1.54 12 10.51 10.50 0.90
H  homogeneous R3 60 10.51 10.50 1.42 12 10.41 10.50 0.98
H  homogeneous R4 60 10.60 10.70 1.47 12 10.60 10.70 1.02
H  homogeneous R5 60 10.61 10.55 1.37 12 10.55 10.60 0.97
H  homogeneous R6 60 10.48 10.50 1.47 12 10.48 10.45 1.01
H  homogeneous R7 60 10.47 10.50 1.51 12 10.40 10.40 0.95
H  homogeneous R8 60 10.56 10.55 1.28 12 10.33 10.45 0.94
a 60 participants (12 groups of 5) were assigned to a control treatment in which each trader submitted an NWTA to sell the same lottery (L). Each group
traded  for 8 rounds, with feedback about market price and trading outcome after each round. 60 participants were given the L lottery and traded in mixed
groups (of 5 or 7) in which some traders had different lotteries. Each group traded for 8 rounds, with feedback about market price (constrained between £7
and  £9) and trading outcome after each round. The same participants were then re-assigned to trade in homogeneous groups of 5 with other participants
endowed with the same lottery.
b 60 participants (12 groups of 5) were assigned to a control treatment in which each trader submitted an NWTA to sell the same lottery (H). Each group
traded for 8 rounds, with feedback about market price and trading outcome after each round. 60 participants were given the H lottery and traded in mixed
groups  (of 5 or 7) in which some traders had different lotteries. Each group traded for 8 rounds, with feedback about market price (constrained between £7
and  £9) and trading outcome after each round. The same participants were then re-assigned to trade in homogeneous groups of 5 with other participants
endowed with the same lottery.
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sig. 2. Results of the FBK manipulation. Evolution of NWTAs and prices in the mixed, homogeneous and control markets. Note: In each panel, dashed lines
epict the relevant control market, and solid lines either the corresponding mixed (panels a and b) or homogeneous market (panels c and d). Triangles are
ean  prices and squares are mean NWTAs.
iscipline, it seems clear that market discipline could have had very little effect on any general trends in the NWTAs reported
y H and L traders in mixed markets. Such trends can safely be treated as isolating the effects of shaping.
By construction, the average market price is constrained to be between £7 and £9, as indicated by the horizontal lines in
anels a and b of Fig. 2. Throughout the eight rounds the mean (median) price fell slightly from £7.93 (£7.90) in R1 to £7.57
£7.50) in R8. As prices for L, these ﬁgures are quite high; as prices for H, they are rather low. Did this price feedback have
ny effect on NWTAs? The answer is a clear yes.
In the top panel of Table 4 and panel a of Fig. 2, we  can see that the mean (median) NWTA for the L lottery rose from £4.64
£4.40) in R1 to £5.67 (£6.45) in R8.17 The strength of these shaping effects is conﬁrmed by the totally different pattern
bserved in control markets, in which NWTAs declined over repetitions. As expected, because participants were randomly
ssigned to the shaping and control treatments, in R1 NWTA values in mixed markets do not differ signiﬁcantly from those
n the control markets (two-tail Mann–Whitney test: Z = −1.32, p = 0.1871). However, the difference between the two groups
s strongly signiﬁcant in R8 (one-tail Mann–Whitney test: Z = −5.39, p < 0.001).
Marked shaping effects, although not as strong as for L, also show up for lottery H. The mean (median) NWTA was
10.91 (£11.10) in the initial round, dropping to £9.91 (£10.45) in R8.18 In the corresponding control market, NWTAs varied
ery little over the course of the eight rounds, starting at £11.17 (£11.45) and ending at £10.97 (£11.20). The between-
ubject comparisons with the control market conﬁrm that these shaping effects were sizeable. NWTAs were not signiﬁcantly
17 In fact, a signiﬁcant increase in NWTAs is already detectable in R2 (Mann–Whitney test: Z = −3.11, p < 0.001).
18 This decrease was  already signiﬁcant in R2 (Mann–Whitney test: Z = 2.26, p < 0.05).
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Table 5
Evolution of NWTA valuations in mixed markets for sellers and non-sellers.
Auction round t NWTAt if sold at t − 1 NWTAt if not sold at t − 1
<0 0 >0 Mean <0 0 >0 Mean
L = (£2, 0.8; £9, 0.2)
R1 1 – – – – – – – –
R2  2 8 13 35 0.49 3 1 0 −2.43
R3  3 10 18 28 0.22 4 0 0 −1.43
R4  4 10 18 30 0.51 2 0 0 −0.10
R5  5 11 17 24 0.11 5 1 2 −1.26
R6  6 11 22 24 0.23 3 0 0 −0.13
R7  7 14 22 18 0.15 4 0 2 −0.83
R8  8 11 22 20 0.11 7 0 0 −1.30
H  = (£7, 0.2; £14, 0.8)
R1 1 – – – – – –
R2  2 0 1 2 0.20 35 15 7 −0.69
R3  3 0 1 1 0.20 31 13 14 −0.32
R4  4 0 0 1 0.30 23 23 13 −0.03
R5  5 0 0 0 (n/a) 14 30 16 0.12
R6  6 1 0 0 −0.20 17 31 11 −0.18
R7  7 0 0 2 2.35 17 28 13 0.16
R8  8 0 2 1 0.27 19 27 11 −0.21Change in NWTA from round to round, NWTAt = NWTAt − NWTAt−1, for participants who sold and participants who  did not sell in the previous round. For
each  round of the auction, the numbers of sellers and non-sellers who decreased, kept constant and increased their NWTA valuation is reported together
with  the mean NWTAt .
different in R1 (two-tail Mann–Whitney test: Z = 0.87, p = 0.3846), but differed strongly after eight auction rounds (one-tail
Mann–Whitney test: Z = 2.78, p < 0.01).19
Taken together, these ﬁndings provide strong support for the implications of Hypothesis 1. We can summarise them as
Result 1b:
Result 1b – Shaping through price feedback. In the absence of market discipline, NWTAs are pulled in the direction of
uninformative price feedback cues.
Our data seem to indicate that shaping effects are stronger when feedback is relatively high (for lottery L) than when it
is low (for lottery H). This forms our second observation.
Observation 2 – Asymmetry in the strength of shaping. When shaping is generated through uninformative price
feedback cues, its effects are stronger when the feedback is relatively high than when it is relatively low.
Before turning to the implications of Hypothesis 2, it is interesting to ask to what extent this aggregate picture reﬂects
general tendencies rather than being driven by a small number of particularly malleable individual valuations. Table 5 reports
information on the round-by-round evolution of NWTAs in mixed markets for L and H, separately for participants who sold
in the previous round and participants who kept their lotteries. The structure of the table is entirely analogous to that of
Table 3.20
As we discussed above, because of our manipulation of the price feedback, there are very few L traders who  do not sell
and very few H traders who do. Amongst the L sellers, the great majority responds by increasing their NWTAs, while H
non-sellers have a preponderant propensity to decrease theirs.21 As in Table 3, these effects slow down slightly over time.
This forms our third observation.
Observation 3 – Shaping at the individual level. Uninformative price feedback cues affect the NWTAs of the majority
of participants in the direction of observed prices.
We now turn to the homogeneous markets and our tests of the implications of Hypothesis 2. The evolution of NWTAs
and prices in the homogeneous and control markets is displayed on the right-hand side of Fig. 2. In homogeneous markets,
the shaping effects generated through price feedback cues are exposed to the effect of market discipline.
The ﬁrst important aspect highlighted by the right-hand side of Fig. 2 is that for both lotteries there is a re-start effect
that partly offsets the shaping effects generated in mixed markets. NWTAs for lottery L drop from their R8 level in mixed
markets, while NWTAs for H increase. That is, L traders (who experienced consistently high prices in a mixed trading group
and responded by gradually increasing their NWTAs) lowered their NWTAs on joining a new trading group, prior to any price
feedback; there is a mirror-image effect for H traders. These effects are suggestive of some form of underlying true values.
19 As explained in Section 3, in some sessions mixed markets came ﬁrst, while in others they followed the market involving lottery E, in which all traders
traded the same lottery. It is reasonable to ask whether shaping effects are stronger in the latter case. We found no order effects of this kind. For both
lotteries and in both R1 and R8, the distributions of NWTAs when mixed markets preceded the market for lottery E are not statistically different from the
distributions when they followed it.
20 The corresponding information for control markets is reported in the Appendix, Table A.3.4.
21 For both lotteries, being a seller in the previous round has a signiﬁcant positive effect (at the 1% level for L and 10% level for H) on NWTAt in a
random-effects panel regression. See Table A.3.2 in the Appendix for details.
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Table  6
Evolution of NWTA valuations in homogeneous markets for sellers and non-sellers.
Auction round t NWTAt if sold at t − 1 NWTAt if not sold at t − 1
<0 0 >0 Mean <0 0 >0 Mean
L = (£2, 0.8; £9, 0.2)
R1 1 – – – – – – – –
R2  2 3 8 13 0.40 29 3 4 −0.94
R3  3 8 5 11 0.15 25 5 6 −0.81
R4  4 7 7 7 0.60 20 7 12 0.13
R5  5 3 7 14 0.52 21 7 8 −0.63
R6  6 4 5 13 0.54 20 14 4 −0.43
R7  7 1 11 10 0.26 17 14 7 −0.43
R8  8 5 10 9 0.57 13 14 9 −0.04
H  = (£7, 0.2; £14, 0.8)
R1 1 – – – – – –
R2  2 0 4 17 0.99 17 10 12 −0.08
R3  3 1 5 17 0.51 16 15 6 −0.39
R4  4 3 9 11 0.18 12 14 11 0.04
R5  5 3 7 13 0.34 16 17 4 −0.20
R6  6 4 7 13 0.17 17 17 2 −0.34
R7  7 2 13 7 0.26 14 20 4 −0.16
R8  8 2 11 9 0.45 11 21 6 −0.13
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Shange in NWTA from round to round, NWTAt = NWTAt − NWTAt−1, for participants who  sold and participants who did not sell in the previous round. For
ach  round of the auction, the numbers of sellers and non-sellers who decreased, kept constant and increased their NWTA valuation is reported together
ith the mean NWTAt .
To test the implications of Hypothesis 2, we look at market prices. For both L and H, the R1 prices in homogeneous markets
ere signiﬁcantly different from those of the corresponding control markets (one-tail Mann–Whitney tests: for L, Z = −4.85,
 < 0.001; for H, Z = 4.61, p < 0.001), showing the continuing effects of the price feedback cues that traders received in the
ixed markets, despite the re-start effect. Over the eight rounds of the homogeneous markets, the prices for L decreased,
hile those for H remained more or less stationary. But at the end of the last auction round, prices were still signiﬁcantly
igher than in the control group for L (one-tail Mann–Whitney test: Z = −1.70, p < 0.05), and still signiﬁcantly lower for
 (one-tail Mann–Whitney test: Z = 1.68, p < 0.05), indicating the persistence of shaping effects on prices. As for our EXP
anipulation, we do not ﬁnd support for the implications of Hypothesis 2.22 Our ﬁndings are summarised in Result 2b.
Result 2b – Persistence of shaping through price feedback. After eight auction rounds, prices that have been shaped
y uninformative price feedback cues are still signiﬁcantly affected by those cues.
Table 6 summarises the evolution of NWTAs over the eight auction rounds of the homogeneous markets for the L and H
otteries. Its structure is analogous to that of Tables 3 and 5. So are the results. For both lotteries, there is a prevalent tendency
or those who have sold in round t to increase their NWTA in round t + 1, and an opposite tendency for those who  have not
old to reduce their stated valuations, with the number of participants who kept their NWTA unaltered slowly increasing
ver the eight auction rounds.23 This forms the basis for our fourth observation.
Observation 4 – NWTA updating in homogeneous markets. In the homogeneous markets, sellers tend to increase their
WTA and non-sellers tend to decrease their NWTA.
The behaviour of L sellers and H non-sellers is of particular interest because it is consistent with shaping but hard to
econcile with market discipline. Remember that all participants entered homogeneous markets after being exposed to the
ixed markets shaping manipulation, which pulled their NWTAs away from their (unobservable) true values. Given the
agnitude of these shaping effects, it is reasonable to infer that, in the ﬁnal rounds of the mixed markets, most L traders
ere over-asking and selling at very advantageous prices, i.e. vi < ai < p. However, when these traders were subsequently
ssigned to homogeneous markets, the median price rule meant that (approximately) three-ﬁfths of them would no longer
ell. According to market discipline, these traders, for whom now vi < p < ai, should decrease their NWTAs, which is what we
ee in Table 6. But even those L traders who continued to sell were likely to be over-asking. For them, vi < ai < p, so market
iscipline would not bite and they should not have changed their behaviour in any systematic way. Yet, as we also see in
able 6, they actually increased their NWTAs more than twice as often as they reduced them – a pattern that suggests they
ere continuing to be inﬂuenced by market price feedback.
The behaviour of H non-sellers shows a mirror image of this pattern. In the ﬁnal rounds of the mixed markets, most H
raders were presumably facing disadvantageous prices, under-asking, but not selling and therefore not subject to market
22 Since in both the homogeneous and control treatments valuations and prices vary little for the H lottery, we do not need to worry about price convergence
n  relation to that lottery. For L, we have estimated asymptotic functions of the same form as for E (see footnote 12). The resulting estimates of p* in the
omogeneous market (£4.23) and in the control market (£3.67) are signiﬁcantly different from each other (p < 0.1). See the Appendix for details.
23 For both lotteries, being a seller in the previous round has a signiﬁcantly positive effect (at the 1% level) on NWTAt in a random-effects panel regression.
ee  Table A.3.2 in the Appendix for details.
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discipline (i.e. p ≤ ai < vi). When they were assigned to homogeneous markets, (approximately) two-ﬁfths of them would sell
their lotteries; market discipline would then lead these traders to raise their NWTAs. But market discipline would not bite
for those with p < ai < vi, who would continue not to sell. And yet, as we see in Table 6, these traders subsequently reduced
their asks more than twice as often as they increased them, once again suggesting that the market price continued to have
some shaping inﬂuence.
Observations 1, 3 and 4 highlight a pervasive tendency for NWTAs to move in the direction of the market price. This
tendency is compatible with another regularity in our data: that the variance of NWTAs within auction groups decreases
over repeated rounds, while NWTA differences between groups increases.24
6. Discussion
In this section, we discuss some issues raised by our results.
The ﬁrst issue concerns the explanation of shaping effects. Our data show an interesting asymmetry which, were it to be
replicated, might throw some light on the mechanism(s) that lie behind shaping: shaping effects seem to be stronger when
NWTAs are being pulled up by high prices than when they are being pulled down by low prices (see observation 2).
This regularity is consistent with the theory of ‘bad deal aversion’ (Isoni, 2011; Weaver and Frederick, 2012; for related
ideas, see Thaler, 1985; Putler, 1992). In this theory, preferences are reference-dependent in a way that makes individuals’
valuations of goods depend directly on price expectations. Speciﬁcally, individuals derive utility from making ‘good deals’
(buying at prices that are lower than expected, selling at prices that are higher than expected) and disutility from making
‘bad deals’ (the opposite). In the context of a selling auction, a trader for whom the expected price is higher than their
reference-independent valuation of the good will report an NWTA higher than that valuation in order to avoid particularly
bad deals; conversely, a trader for whom the expected price is lower than their reference-independent valuation will state
an NWTA lower than that valuation in order to enjoy particularly good deals. If, other things being equal, the pain of bad
deals is stronger than the pleasure of good ones, the tendency for NWTAs to be pulled up by high price expectations will be
stronger than the tendency for them to be pulled down by low expectations.
An alternative explanation of this apparent asymmetry is the following. When NWTAs are being pulled up by a high
market price, the traders whose preferences are being shaped are trading at,  and beneﬁting from, that price. These features
of the price may  contribute to its psychological salience and may  encourage further over-asking, in the belief that this could
prolong a particularly favourable state of affairs. Conversely, when NWTAs are being pulled down by a low price, the traders
whose preferences are being shaped are not trading at that price, and the low level of the price is a source of disbeneﬁt to
them.25
A more fundamental issue raised by our results is that of explaining why  shaping effects are partially but not wholly eroded
by market discipline. Had we found that shaping effects were completely resistant to market discipline, that would have
been consistent with the hypothesis, advocated by some psychologists, that preferences do not exist prior to elicitation, and
are constructed by individuals as and when they are needed (e.g. Payne et al., 1993, 1999; Slovic, 1995; Stewart et al., 2006).
But that is not what we found.
Alternatively, suppose we had found that, when market discipline was  switched on, market prices converged towards
values that were independent of our shaping manipulations. That would have been consistent with an interpretation of
Plott’s (1996) discovered preference hypothesis in which the discovery mechanism is market discipline (Loomes et al., 2003).
According to this account, psychological factors may  cause irrelevant cues to have signiﬁcant impacts on market behaviour,
so long as that behaviour does not lead individuals to make losses; but when behaviour is subject to market discipline, true
preferences are gradually discovered. But again, that is not what we  found.
In broad-brush terms, what we seem to have found is the following. When our shaping manipulations induce large
changes in NWTAs (as in the mixed market for lottery L), the initial effect of introducing market discipline is that NWTAs
move in the direction that offsets this shaping (NWTAs for L decrease in the early rounds of the homogeneous market).
Indeed, a detectable move in this direction is induced merely by telling participants that they have joined a new trading
group (NWTAs for L are already lower in R1 of the homogeneous market than they are in R8 of the mixed market). These
effects might indicate that participants have some vague sense that their shaping-induced NWTAs do not altogether reﬂect
their underlying preferences. However, the effects of shaping are not eliminated. After eight auction rounds in which market
discipline has been switched on, market prices still do not converge to values independent of the shaping manipulation. The
implication is that participants are not discovering precise underlying valuations.
24 Table A.3.5 in the Appendix reports the within- and between-group variances of NWTAs for all or our treatments in R1 and R8. In ﬁve out of six cases,
the  within-group variance falls between R1 and R8. NWTA distributions are not different across auction groups in matched treatments in R1, as one would
expect given that participants have been assigned to treatments at random. But the null hypotheses that NWTAs are the same across groups can be rejected
in  ﬁve out of six cases in R8. A similar result is found by Tufano (2009).
25 This idea was  suggested to us by Ben McQuillin. Note that, while evidence suggests that participants in auctions may  derive utility from the fact that
they  are ‘winning’ the auction (e.g. Dechenaux et al., 2014), joy of winning seems incompatible with the asymmetry that we ﬁnd (as well as the general
trends  in valuation updating shown in Tables 3, 5 and 6) because, in a selling auction like ours, L traders should, if anything, decrease their NWTAs instead
of  increasing them as they clearly do.
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One hypothesis that is consistent with this combination of observations is that each individual has broad preferences
hich exist prior to elicitation, but which are characterised by some degree of noise or imprecision (see, for example, Butler
nd Loomes, 2007). This idea can be applied to the case of a selling auction by generalising the model we  presented in Section
 in the following way. For each trader i, there is an imprecision interval of values [vimin, vimax], with the interpretation that i
knows’ that their value lies in this interval, but cannot specify that value with any more precision. The rules of the auction
echanism require i to report a unique NWTA ai in any given round. Because of random error and systematic behavioural
nomalies, ai need not lie within the imprecision interval. Market discipline comes into play when the market price p is such
hat i is sure that their chosen ai has led to a loss. This is the case if ai ≥ p > vimax (unambiguous over-asking) or vimin > p > ai
unambiguous under-asking). In each of these cases, i responds by adjusting their next-round NWTA in the direction of their
mprecision interval. If the market is repeated, changes in behaviour will continue to be induced among marginal traders
ntil p ≥ vimin holds for each of the (n − 1)/2 traders i who  sell, and vjmax ≥ p holds for each of the (n + 1)/2 traders j who
ail to sell. This result deﬁnes an interval of preference-consistent values to which the market price converges. If a shaping
anipulation pulls the price outside this interval, market discipline will tend to pull it back; but once the price is within the
nterval, market discipline ceases to operate. Thus, shaping manipulations may  have a persistent effect on the location of
he market price within the preference-consistent interval.
. Conclusion
Our results raise doubts about a fundamental assumption of traditional economic analysis – that individuals have precise
rue preferences that are independent of the market institution in which they are revealed. We  have found that experimental
anipulations of exogenous and endogenous price cues can have a substantial and cumulative impact on the amount of
oney that people are willing to accept in exchange for items in their possession, even when values are entirely private and
aluations are elicited using a demand-revealing market institution. There is a systematic tendency for individuals’ stated
aluations in such markets to be pulled towards the prices that have been observed in previous market rounds, and/or that
ndividuals expect to observe in current and future rounds.
By using experimental designs which allow the disciplining effects of markets to be ‘switched off’, we  have been able to
bserve shaping effects in isolation, and we have found these effects to be signiﬁcant. The ﬁnding that these effects operate
ot only for exogenous price cues, but also for cues that are endogenous to the way markets normally operate suggests
hat the conventional belief in the ability of markets to reveal preferences in an unbiased manner may  not be warranted.
hen individuals are exposed to market discipline, there is a tendency for the more extreme effects of previous shaping to
e eroded. However, substantial elements of shaping persist. To the extent that these effects enter into market prices that
xert continuing inﬂuences on stated valuations, the operation of markets may  actually consolidate them.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
.jebo.2015.11.006.
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